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Product differentiation in a vertical structure 
 
1. Introduction 
There is a debate regarding firms’ preference for horizontal product differentiation, 
which helps to increase profits by reducing competition. It follows from Singh and 
Vives (1984) that firms prefer maximal product differentiation. Fanti and Meccheri 
(2014) and Inomata (2018) also show that firms prefer maximal differentiation.1 In 
contrast, Haskel et al. (2013) and Kawasaki and Matsushima (2019) show that firms 
may prefer minimal differentiation. Haskel et al. (2013) consider two types of product 
substitutability in the airline industry – between the pair of routes from the same airport 
and between the airports. They find that the airlines prefer minimal difference for the 
former but maximal difference for the latter. Considering the airline industry, Kawasaki 
and Matsushima (2019) find that profit can be maximised at minimal differentiation. 
 While these papers provide important insights, they did not pay much attention 
to a common phenomenon, viz., vertical relationship, which can be observed in many 
industries, such as automobile, computer, cellular phones and construction. The 
purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by analysing firms’ preference for horizontal 
product differentiation under vertical relationship. 
Our motivation for looking at the implications of vertical relationship also 
comes from the recent literature showing that the presence of vertical relationship may 
alter the relationship between competition and profit significantly. Considering 
homogeneous products and free entry in the input sector, Matsushima (2006) shows 
that more final goods producers increase total profits of the final goods producers by 
                                                 
1 Fanti and Meccheri (2014) and Inomata (2018) show U-shaped relationships between product 
differentiation and firm’s profits, where profits are maximised at maximal differentiation. 
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reducing the input price. Wang and Lee (2015) show that more final goods producers 
increase total profits of the final goods producers in the presence of free entry in the 
input sector if knowledge spillover from R&D in the final goods market is high and the 
entry cost in the input sector is moderate. Mukherjee (2019) shows that if the final 
goods are sufficiently differentiated, more firms in the final goods market create a 
favourable input-price effect and increase the profits of each final goods producer in 
the presence of free entry in the input sector.2 
The striking implications of the input market discussed above motivate us to 
analyse the effects of the input market on firms’ preference for horizontal product 
differentiation that has been overlooked in the literature. In this respect, we show how 
market expansion following horizontal product differentiation affects the decision for 
product differentiation. Since horizontal product differentiation is often used to 
measure competition (Raith, 2003, Aghion et al., 2005 and Sacco and Schmutzler, 
2011), our results also suggest whether firms prefer to create less competition through 
horizontal product differentiation under a vertical relationship. 
We show in Section 2 that if product differentiation does not increase the market 
size significantly, the final goods producers may not prefer maximal product 
differentiation (i.e., may not prefer minimum competition) but may prefer moderate 
differentiation under free entry in the input market. This result occurs under both 
Cournot and Bertrand competition in the final goods market. This happens because 
product differentiation creates two opposing effects. Product differentiation reduces 
                                                 
2 While these papers look at symmetric firms, as considered in the present paper, Mukherjee et al. (2008 
and 2009) show that more firms in the downstream market can increase respectively the total profits of 
the final goods producers and the profit of each final goods producer in the presence of cost asymmetry 
among the final goods producers. In an earlier paper, Tyagi (1999) shows that more final goods producers 
may increase the profit of each final goods producer in the presence of a monopoly input supplier if the 
demand function for the final goods is sufficiently convex. Unlike the papers mentioned in the text 
considering successive oligopoly models, Naylor (2002) show that more final goods producers can 
increase total profits of the final goods producers in the presence of firm-specific bargaining between the 
final goods producers and the input suppliers.  
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aggressive behaviour among the final goods producers, which reduces their outputs and 
the input demand. Lower input demand leads to fewer input suppliers or higher market 
concentration in the input market, which increases the input price. Hence, on one hand, 
increased differentiation tends to increase the profits of the final goods producers for a 
given input price by reducing competition, but on the other hand, it tends to reduce the 
profits of the final goods producers by increasing the input price. The rising input price 
may prevent the final goods producers from creating maximal differentiation. 
 The input-price effect mentioned above is responsible for our result of no 
maximal differentiation. This mechanism gets empirical support from Friedson and Li 
(2015), which show that more hospitals (the downstream agents) in an area attract more 
local independent medical labs (the upstream agents) providing intermediate services, 
like testing physical samples, to the hospitals (i.e., increased ‘‘input sharing’’) and 
reduces prices of the intermediate services. Holmes (1999), Fee and Thomas (2004) 
and Li (2013) also provide the evidences of increased input sharing. 
 The mechanism discussed in Section 2 is more general than what is shown there. 
Our qualitative results hold even if there is no free entry in the input sector, but the 
above-mentioned input-price effect occurs depending on the market expansion effects 
of product differentiation. We show this in Section 3, where we consider a monopolist 
input supplier, thus considering an exogenously given input sector with no competition 
among the input suppliers, but assume that the input supplier has increasing returns to 
scale technology, which is consistent with the well-known fact that input productions 
often experience economies of scale (Besanko et al., 2013). 
Considering a monopolist input supplier with increasing returns to scale 
technology, we show under both Cournot and Bertrand competition in the final goods 
market that the final goods producers may not prefer maximal product differentiation 
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but may prefer moderate differentiation if product differentiation does not increase the 
market size significantly. This happens because of the input-price effects discussed 
above. However, here the input-price effect is not created by market concentration in 
the input market, but it is created by the increasing returns in input production. 
 Our paper can be related to the literature following the seminal paper by 
Hotelling (1929), which shows that firms prefer minimal differentiation. Vickrey 
(1964) and D’Aspremont et al. (1979) corrected an error in Hotelling (1929) and 
showed that firms prefer maximal differentiation. Economides (1984, 1986) also 
support the conclusion of maximal differentiation. However, there is another set of 
papers which restore Hotelling’s conclusion of minimal differentiation in the presence 
of collusion in prices (Jehiel, 1992 and Friedman and Thisse, 1993)3, consumption 
externality (Cintio, 2006), and consumers’ incremental utility from purchasing multiple 
products and preference uncertainty (Kim and Serfes, 2006 and Guo, 2006).4 There are 
some papers showing firms’ preference for a moderate differentiation due to the 
presence of mixed pricing strategy (Osborne and Pitchik, 1987), endogenous leader-
follower structure (Meza and Tombak, 2009),5 incentive delegation (Kou and Zhou, 
2015), and when not-buying a product is an option to the consumers (Pazgal et al., 
2016). 
                                                 
3 Matsumura and Matsushima (2011) show that minimal differentiation does not occur in a collusive 
equilibrium if the firms differ in costs. 
4 Although majority of papers using the Hotelling framework consider that firms locate within the 
“Hotelling line”, there are papers which don’t restrict firms to locate within the Hotelling line. It is shown 
that firms prefer larger differentiation when they are not restricted within the Hotelling line (see, e.g., 
Tabuchi and Thisse, 1995 and Matsumura and Matsushima, 2012). There is another literature examining 
the conditions for maximal and minimal differentiation in a circular city model (see, e.g., Eaton and 
Lipsey, 1975, Salop, 1979 and Karlson, 1985). 
There is a strand of literature considering firms’ location choice in linear cities or in circular 
cities with linear demand functions with substitutable or complementary goods. The results show that 
firms prefer maximal or minimal distance depending on the type of competition (Cournot or Bertrand), 
how the consumers are located (on a linear-city or on a circular-city) and whether the goods are 
substitutes or complements (Liang et al., 2006, Pal, 1998, Shimizu, 2002 and Sun, 2014). 
5 Matsumura and Matsushima (2010) extend Meza and Tombak (2009) to show the effects on R&D 
investments, consumer surplus and welfare. 
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There are few papers examining firms’ preference for product differentiation in 
a Hotelling model with strategic input price determination. Matsushima (2004, 2009) 
show that when the transport costs faced by the upstream firms are small or the 
difficulty in converting inputs to the final goods is low (which are comparable to our 
case with no transportation cost faced by the upstream firms or no difficulty in 
converting inputs to the final goods), the firms prefer maximal differentiation. 
Considering bilateral bargaining between the input supplier and the final goods 
producers, Brekke and Straume (2004)6 show that the final goods producers prefer to 
increase differentiation as far as possible. 
The papers mentioned in the previous paragraph differ from our paper in terms 
of the structure as well as the result. Unlike those papers considering inelastic unit 
demand function and price competition in the final goods market, we consider a 
successive oligopoly model under output and price competition in the final goods 
market with quadratic utility functions of the consumers which are affected by product 
differentiation. In contrast to these papers, we show that firms may not prefer maximal 
product differentiation depending on the input market structure, input production 
technology and the market expansion effect. 
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the 
model and shows the results under free entry in the input market. Section 3 considers 





                                                 
6 Brekke and Straume (2004) don’t restrict the final goods producers within the Hotelling line. 
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2. Free entry in the input market 
2.1. Cournot competition in the final goods market 
Consider a successive oligopoly model like Matsushima (2006) and Mukherjee (2019)7 
where ( )2n ≥  final goods producers produce horizontally differentiated products by 
using a critical input produced in an endogenously determined oligopolistic input 
market. Assume that each final goods producer requires one unit of input to produce 
one unit of the final goods. 
While the number of final goods producers is given exogenously, there are many 
input suppliers and free entry in the input sector determines the number of active input 
suppliers. If an input supplier enters the market, it incurs a fixed entry cost, K. For 
simplicity, we normalise the marginal cost of input production to 0. There are no other 
costs for input production. We also assume for simplicity that the only cost faced by 
the final goods producers is the price of the input. 








P q g qα
=
≠
= − −  , where 1 ( 1)(1 )s n gα = + − − , and iP  and iq  are the 
price and output of good i  respectively.8 The term [0,1]g ∈  shows the degree of 
product differentiation and the term s captures market expansion, which we explain 
below. The products are perfect substitutes (isolated) if 1g =  ( 0g = ). 
Adding the inverse demand functions, we get 
( ) ( )( )
1
1




Q q n g s n g n P
−
=







=   denotes the 
                                                 
7 Mukherjee (2019) extends Matsushima (2006) with differentiated final goods. 
8 This demand function is generated from the utility function 
( ) ( ) 2
1 1 , 1
1
1 1 1 ,
2
n n n
i i i j
i i i j
i j
U q s n g q g q q ξ
= = =
≠
 = − + − − − +    where ξ  is the numeraire good. 
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average price. If 1s = , the total output is independent of g. Hence, the demand function 
is like Shubik and Levitan (1980) for 1s = , where product differentiation does not affect 
the market size.9 The total demand increases for 1s < , and in the case of 0s = , we get 
a demand function like Bowley (1924), where differentiation increases the market size 
completely. As s reduces from 1 to 0, the term 1 ( 1)(1 )s n gα = + − −  reduces from 
1 ( 1)(1 )n gα = + − −  to 1α = . Thus, s and α  help to capture a wide range of demand 
functions from Shubik and Levitan (1980) to Bowley (1924), depending on the extent 
of market expansion.10 
 Consider a three-stage game. At stage 1, the input suppliers take the entry 
decision. At stage 2, the input suppliers who entered the market determine their outputs 
like Cournot oligopolists, and the input price, w, is determined. At stage 3, the final 
goods producers determine their outputs like Cournot oligopolists and the profits are 
realised. We solve the game through backward induction. 
 Given the input price w, the ith final goods producer determines its output by 










Max q g q w qα
=
≠
− − − .       (1) 
The equilibrium output is 
 c* 1
2 2 (1 )( 1)
i
w




− + + − −
= .       (2) 
                                                 
9 Ardelean (2006) shows that consumer’s love of variety can be very limited. It is shown in behavioural 
economics and behavioural finance that variety brought by product differentiation is not always “the 
more the merrier”. The effect of “choice overload” may also suggest against love for variety (Iyengar 
and Kamenica, 2010, Malone and Lusk, 2017 and Hefti, 2018). 
10 One may look at Choné and Linnemer (2020), which review the development of the linear demand 
systems following the introduction of a quasilinear quadratic utility model as the foundation of a linear 
demand system by Levitan and Shubik in the 1960s. 
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The total input demand is c* (1 )










− + + − −
= = , which gives 
(2 ) 2 (1 )( 1)c n g I gnI sI g nw
n
− − − − − −
= . 
If m input suppliers entered the market, the kth input supplier determines its 
output by maximising the following expression: 
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n+ − + + − −
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, which is independent of g, and it is due to the reason provided in 
Dhillon and Petrakis (2002), i.e., the equilibrium input price is independent of product 
differentiation if the input supplier’s equilibrium output and the equilibrium profit are 
log-linear in the input price and the market parameters. 








, the equilibrium profit of the kth input 
supplier who entered the market is 
( ) ( )
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+ − + + − −
= . 
Hence, the free entry equilibrium number of input supplier is given by 
( ) ( )
2
0






m g gn s g
π − =
+ − + + − −






2 2 (1 )( 1)
n




− + + − −




K <  so that at least one input supplier enters the market for any values of n 
and g. 
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.    (6) 
 
Proposition 1: Higher product differentiation (i.e., lower g) increases (decreases) the 
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Proposition 2: Consider Cournot competition in the final goods market. If there is free 
entry in the input market, the final goods producers do not prefer maximal horizontal 
product differentiation but prefer moderate product differentiation for 
* 1( , )
8
K K∈  
where 
2









Proof: Differentiating (7) with respect to g and evaluating it at g = 0, we get 
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. Hence, g = 0 is not the preferred 
differentiation for 
* 1( , )
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 We also get  
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K ∈ .12 
 Hence, if 
* 1( , )
8
K K∈ , neither g = 0 nor g = 1 is the preferred differentiation, 
implying firms prefer moderate differentiation in this situation. ■ 
 
 If s = 1, the condition in Proposition 2 always holds since 0K > . However, if 
0s = , the condition in Proposition 2 holds provided 2K n>  but this is not feasible 
since we assume 
1
8
K < , so that at least one input supplier enters for any values of n and 
g. Hence, the condition in Proposition 2 does not hold for s = 0. Since 
∗

< 0,  >
∗(
 = 1) and  < ∗(
 = 0), there is a critical s, say, *s , such that  > ∗ for 
 >

∗, implying that the final goods producers’ do not prefer maximal horizontal product 
differentiation but prefer moderate differentiation if product differentiation does not 
increase the market size significantly. 
The reason for the above result is as follows. If product differentiation does not 
increase the market size significantly, a higher product differentiation creates two 
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opposing effects on the profits of the final goods producers. On one hand, it tends to 
increase the profits of the final goods producers by reducing competition, but, on the 
other hand, it tends to increase the input price by increasing concentration in the input 
sector. The rising input price may not encourage the final goods producers to do 
maximal differentiation if product differentiation does not increase the market size 
significantly. 
It is worth mentioning that free entry in the input market is important for our 







, implying that there is no input-price effect following product 
differentiation but product differentiation helps to increase the profits of the final goods 
producers by reducing competition. In this situation, the final goods producers prefer 
maximal differentiation.13 
 
2.2. Bertrand competition in the final goods market 
We show in this subsection that the qualitative results under Cournot competition 
remains under Bertrand competition in the final goods market. We consider a game like 
subsection 2.1 with the exception that the final goods producers compete like Bertrand 
oligopolists. 
 Since the analysis and the proof are like Section 3.1, to save space, we mention 
the result in the text and relegate the calculations to Appendix A. 
 
                                                 
13     If the number of input suppliers is given exogenously, the profit of the ith final goods producer is 
2
2 2
c* (1 (1 )( 1))
(1 ) (2 2 (1 )( 1))
i
m s g n
m g gn s g n
π
+ − −
+ − + + − −




( 1)( 2 (4 2 2(1 )( 1)s))
0
(1 ) (2 2 (1 )( 1))
i m n s g n gn g n
m g gng s g n
π∂
=
− − + − − + + − −
<




Proposition 3: Consider Bertrand competition in the final goods market. If there is free 
entry in the input market, the final goods producers do not prefer maximal horizontal 
product differentiation but prefer moderate differentiation for 
* 1( , )
8
K K∈  where 
2










The reason for the above result is like the reason discussed after Proposition 2. 
 
3. Monopoly input supplier with increasing returns to scale technology 
3.1. Cournot competition in the final goods market 
Now we consider a model like the previous section with the exception that there is a 
monopolist input supplier with increasing returns to scale technology. We consider a 
monopolist input supplier to show the effects of scale economies only by assuming 
away competition in the input market. There are two reasons for looking at economies 
of scale in input production. First, as mentioned in Besanko et al. (2013), the input 
productions often experience economies of scale. Second, we show that endogenous 
input market structure is not necessary for the results derived in the previous section. 
Our qualitative results remain as long as the input-price effect discussed in the previous 
section occurs following a higher product differentiation, and economies of scale in 
input production is another candidate to create that type of input-price effect. 
Assume that the total cost of production faced by the input supplier is 
2
TC cI dI= − , with 1c < , 2 0c dI− > , where , 0c d >  and I is the total input produced. 
This is a simplified version of the textbook cost function 2 3TC a cI dI eI= + − + . To 
show the implications of increasing returns in input production in the simplest way, we 
assume that 0a e= = . The properties of the cost function considered here are as 
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follows. We get the average cost as AC c dI= −  and the marginal cost as 
2MC c dI AC= − < . Given our assumption of 2 0c dI− > , both the marginal and 
average costs are positive. 
 The equilibrium output of the ith final goods producer is given by (2). Hence, 
the input demand curve is 
(2 ) 2 (1 )( 1)ci n g I gnI sI g nw
n
− − − − − −
= . The monopolist 
input supplier determines its output by maximising the following expression: 
2(2 ) 2 (1 )( 1) ( )
I
n g I gnI sI g n
Max I cI dI
n
− − − − − − 
− − 
 
.   (8) 




2 2 2 (1 )( 1)
ci c n
g gn dn s g n
I
−
− + − + − −
= .                (9) 
 We get *2 0cic dI− >  for 
(2 2 (1 )( 1)) cic g gn s g nd d
n
− + + − −
< ≡ , which is 
assumed to hold. 
The equilibrium input price is 
 
* 1 (1 )1
2 2 2 (1 )( 1)
ci c dn
w c
g gn dn s g n
 −
= + − 
− + − + − − 
.             (10) 
 
Proposition 4: Higher product differentiation (i.e., lower g) increases (decreases) the 




s > < . 
Proof: We get that 
2
* (1 )( 1)(1 2s)
( )0
2(2 2 (1 )( 1))
ci dn c n



















s > < , a higher product differentiation decreases (increases) input supply14 
and increases the equilibrium input price due to increasing returns in input production. 
Proposition 4 is like Proposition 1 and it plays the important role in determining the 
final goods producers’ preference for product differentiation. 






(1 c) (1 (1 ))
4 2 2 (1 )( 1)
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= .              (11) 
 
Proposition 5: Consider Cournot competition in the final goods market. If there is a 
monopolist input supplier with increasing returns to scale technology, the final goods 
producers do not prefer maximal differentiation but prefer moderate differentiation for 
* min{ , }cid d d d< < , where  *









=  and 
(2 2 (1 )( 1))ci c g gn s g nd
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− + + − −
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*
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14 We get that 
( )
2
* (1 ) ( 1)(1 2 )
( )0
2 2 2 (1 )( 1)
ci
c n n s
g gn dn sg g n
I − − −
> <
− + − +∂ − −
∂












< ≡  , where ( ) cid d> < , implying g = 1 is not the preferred 
differentiation for min{ , }cid d d< . 
Since * ( ) cid d> < and * ( )d d> < , neither g = 0 nor g = 1 is the preferred 
differentiation for 
* min{ , }cid d d d< < , implying firms prefer moderate differentiation 
in this situation.■ 
 
 If s = 1, the condition in Proposition 5 holds for d > 1. However, if 0s = , the 
condition in Proposition 5 does not hold. Since 
∗

< 0,  > ∗(
 = 1) for  > 1 and 
 < ∗(
 = 0), if d > 1, we get that there is a critical s, say, 
∗∗, such that  > ∗ for 

 > 
∗∗, implying that if the economies of scale in input production is sufficiently 
strong, the final goods producers’ do not prefer maximal horizontal product 
differentiation but prefer moderate differentiation if product differentiation does not 
increase the market size significantly. 
If the scale economies in input production is sufficiently strong, a higher product 
differentiation creates significant adverse input-price effect when product 
differentiation does not increase the market size significantly. In this situation, the 
adverse input-price effect dominates the favourable competition reducing effect of a 
higher product differentiation and the firms’ do not prefer maximal differentiation. 
 
3.2. Bertrand competition in the final goods market 
Now we show that a qualitative result like Proposition 5 remains under Bertrand 
competition in the final goods market. We consider a game similar to subsection 3.1 
with the exception that the final goods producers compete like Bertrand oligopolists. 
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 Since the analysis and the proof are like Section 3.1, to save space, we mention 
the result in the text and relegate the calculations to Appendix B. 
 
Proposition 6: Consider Bertrand competition in the final goods market. If there is a 
monopolist input supplier with increasing returns to scale technology, the final goods 
producers do not prefer maximal horizontal product differentiation but prefer moderate 
differentiation for 
*( , )bid d d∈  where *





(2 3 2 (1 )( 1))(1 ( 1)(1 ) ( 1))
(1 2 (1 )( 1) )
bi c g gn s g n g n s s nd
n g gn g n s
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We provide a new rationale for not creating maximal horizontal product differentiation. 
We show that the final goods producers may not prefer maximal differentiation but may 
prefer moderate differentiation under both Cournot and Bertrand competition in the 
final goods market if product differentiation does not increase the market size 
significantly and there is either free entry in the input market or the input supplier has 
increasing returns to scale technology. Hence, our reasons for moderate horizontal 
product differentiation, which are based on the input market structure, input production 
technology and the market expansion effect, are different from the existing reasons of 
mixed pricing strategy, endogenous leadership, no-buy option for the consumers and 








A Bertrand competition under free entry in the input sector: 
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=
≠
= − −  , where 
1 ( 1)(1 )s n gα = + − − , the corresponding direct demand function is 
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 Given the input price w, the ith final goods producer maximises ( − ) with 
respect to price. The equilibrium price and output can be found as 
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respectively. 
 The total input demand is 
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 If m input suppliers entered the market, the kth input supplier determines its 
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, which is independent of g. This is similar to the result under Cournot 
competition in the final goods market and as mentioned in section 2.1, it is due to the 
reason provided in Dhillon and Petrakis (2002). 
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K <  so that at least one input supplier enters the market for any values of n 
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. Hence, g = 0 is not the preferred differentiation for 
* 1( , )
8
K K∈ . Since we are looking at the change in profit with respect to g and 
evaluating it at g = 0, it is intuitive that the critical conditions are the same under 
Cournot and Bertrand competition since the type of competition does not matter at g = 
0. 
We also get 
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that g = 1 is not the preferred differentiation. 
Hence, if 
* 1( , )
8
K K∈ , neither g = 0 nor g = 1 is the preferred differentiation, 
implying firms prefer moderate differentiation in this situation. 
 
B Bertrand competition under monopolist input supplier with economies of scale 
Given the direct demand function, the ith final goods producer maximises ( − ) 
with respect to price. The equilibrium price and output can be found as 
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The monopolist input supplier determines its output by maximising 
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assumed to hold. 
Inserting (B2) into (B1) for I gives the equilibrium input price, ∗. Using 
∗, 

∗ and ∗, we get the equilibrium profit of the ith final goods producer as 
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*2(1 )(1 ( 1) )s n sd d
ns
− + −
> ≡  where 
* ( ) bid d> < . Hence, g = 0 is not the preferred 
differentiation for *( , )bid d d∈ . Since we are looking at the change in profit with 
respect to g and evaluating it at g = 0, it is intuitive that the critical conditions are the 
same under Cournot and Bertrand competition since the type of competition does not 
matter at g = 0. 
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, implying that g = 1 is not the 
preferred differentiation. Since the final goods producers get zero profits under 
Bertrand competition if the products are homogeneous, they always prefer some 
differentiation in this situation. 
Hence, if *( , )bid d d∈ , neither g = 0 nor g = 1 is the preferred differentiation, 
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